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WEST FIRGINA11 LAW QUABTERLY
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS FOR BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES--RIGHT OF BENEFIC-
IARY TO SUE IN WEST VmGnNA.-Just what is the right of a third
party to sue in West Virginia upon a contract to which he is not a
party has caused much confusion. In order to reconcile the West
Virginia cases on this subject, it is important to distinguish between
the two classes of contracts which pass under the term of con-
tracts for the benefit of third parties.
First, we have the so-called sole beneficiary type of contract,
where the promisee has no pecuniary interest in the performance
of the contract, which is made solely for the benefit of another
person. A typical illustration of such a contract'is an ordinary life
insurance contract payable to some one other than the insured. The
benef ciary is not a party to the contract. The promisee is enti-
tled to sue for breach of contract, but having suffered no pecuniary
damage by the debtor's failure to perform, would not seem upon
principle entitled to recover substantial damages.' The right of
a third party to maintain an action at law upon such a contract
has never been recognized in England. 2  The English courts have
so steadily refused to grant any relief to a beneficiary under such
contracts, that by the Married Women's Property Act a wife, or
husband, or child named as beneficiary in an insurance policy is
entitled to the proceeds of the policy although not entitled to sue
for them directly.' But the English view as to sole beneficiary
contracts has never prevailed in this country. The prevailing view
in the United States is that the party in interest may maintain an
action in his own name upon such a contract.4 The right of the
beneficiary to sue in West Virginia upon such a contract is now
guaranteed by statute,' which provides:
"If a covenant or promise be made for the sole benefit of a
person with whom it is not made, or with whom it is made
1 West v. Houghton, 4 C. P. D. 197 (1879) ; Burbank v. Gould, 15 Me. 118(1838) ; Watson v. Randall, 20 Wend. 201 (N. Y. 1838) ; Adams v. Union R. Co.,
21 R. I. 134, 42 Atl. 515 (1899). See WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 357.
2 Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393 (1861) ; Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n, 1 Q. B. D. 147 (1892).
* 45 & 46 VICT., C. 75, § 11.
* Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143 (1876) ; Hartman v. Pistorlus, 248 I1. 143,
94 N. E. 131 (1911) ; Baird v. Erie R. Co., 210 N. Y. 225, 104 N. E. 614 (1914).
5 W. VA. CODE, c. 71, § 2.
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jointly with others, such person may maintain, in his own
name, any action thereon which he might maintain in case it
had been made with him only, and the consideration hadl
moved from him to the party making such covenant or
promise. "
However, the provisions of this statute have never been extended:
to any other than the sole beneficiary type of contract, and our
court has said "a stranger to a contract cannot sue on it, by vir-
tue of this statute unless it was made primarily for his benefit." 8
Second, we have the so-called debtor-creditor type of contract,
where the promisee seeks indirectly to discharge an obligation of
his own to a third person by securing from the promisor a promise
to pay his creditor. New York has gone farther than any other
state in the debtor-creditor case, and allows the third party not a.
party to the contract to maintain an action upon such contractr
Today, while very few jurisdictions profess to follow Lawrence v.
Fox, the states are very few that do not allow the creditor to.
maintain a direct action against the promisor. The most universal
illustration of this right of the creditor to sue is where the grantee
.of premises subject to a mortgage assumes and agrees to pay the
mortgage. England gives the mortgagee no might to maintain an
action upon such a contract,8 but Massachusetts is the only juris-
diction in this country where it has been definitely decided that
the mortgagee cannot proceed against the grantee.' However,
many jurisdictions treat mortgages separately from the ordinary
debtor-creditor type of contract, although on principle there seems
to be no real difference between the two. In many jurisdictions
where the right of a third party to sue at law on such contracts is
not recognized, he is nevertheless allowed to sue in equity
under the doctrine of subrogation.'0 This is the view that
has been adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court," and it is
under that doctrine that the West Virginia cases on this subject
can be reconciled. West Virginia has denied relief to the creditor
who sues on such contracts only where the action has been brought
a Johnson v. McClung, 26 W. Va. 659 (1885); King v. Scott, 76 W. Va. 58, E4
S. p. 954 (1915) ; Hamilton v. Wheeling Public Service Co., 88 W. Va. 573, 107 S. EL
401 (1921).
7 Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
s Tweddel v. Tweddel, 2 Bro. Ch. 152 (1787); Oxford v. Rodney, 14 Ves. 41T(1807).ellen .Whipple, 1 Gray 317 (Mass. 1854); Creesy -v. Willis, 159 Mass. 249.
34 N. U. 265 (1893).
10 Smith V. Robins, 236 Fed. 114 (1916); Palmer v. Bray, 136 Mich. 85, 98 N. W.
849 (1904) ; Crowell v. St. Barnabas Hospital, 27 N. J. Eq. 650 (1876).
n Johnson v. McClung, supra; King v. Scott, supra; Hamilton v. Wheeling Public
Service Co., supra; Hooper v. Hooper, 32 W. Va. 526, 9 S. E. 937 (1889) ; Bensimer
v. Fell, 85 W. Va. 15, 12 S. E. 1078 (1891).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [1922], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol28/iss4/9
WBST VIRGINIA LAW QUABTERLY
:at law, where the doctrine of subrogation is not recognized. There
;are no reported cases in this state where the remedy has been
-refused the beneficiary when the action was a bill in equity. The
:seeming conflict in the West Virginia cases is readily explainable
on. the theory that the right of the third party to sue at law in West
Virginia on such contracts is not recognized, but when he sues in
equity he is given substantially the same relief under the doctrine
,of subrogation.
-M. T. V.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - LooK AND LISTEN RULE.-The
plaintiff sued for injuries sustained while attempting to cross the
-tracks of the defendant. He passed between freight cars standing
on the side track and started to cross the middle track, when he
was struck by an engine. Nine feet separated the tracks, and
-plaintiff had an unobstructed view each way, but failed to look
in the direction of the approaching engine. Held, recovery is
denied. Failure to use his senses amounts to contributory negli-
gence, which becomes a question of law for the court and not for the
jury. Robinson v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 110 S. E. 870 (W.
Va. 1922.)
Widely divergent views exist among the various state courts in
regard to the liability of the railroad for injuries to pedestrians
who fail to stop, look and listen before attempting to cross the rail-
road track. Pennsylvania enforces the arbitrary rule, declaring
failure to observe the rule is negligence as a matter of law. The
decisions declare the rule to be "peremptory, absolute and un-
'bending." Aiken v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 130 Pa. 380, 18 Atl. 686.
This extreme rule has practically no follbwing, and has received
widespread criticism. 1 A M. LAw REP. 204. The view that it is
not a rule of evidence, but one of absolute and unbending law
cannot be affirmed as a rule of American law. 2 THOMPsON, NEG-
uGENCE, § 1642. For the court to say that the plaintiff is negligent
;as a matter of law in every case if he does not stop, look and listen,
seems to be an unwarranted encroachment on the province of the
jury. 13 HARv. L. REV. 226. Other authorities emphatically
maintain that such failure on the part of the plaintiff is not neg-
ligence per se, or as a matter of law, but is only evidence to be sub-
-mitted to the jury. 2 THoMPsON, NEGLIGENCE, § 1642; Judson v.
Central Vermont R. Co., 158 N. Y. 597, 53 N. E. 514; Illinois Cen-
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